From Global Tensions to Global Catastrophe: Historical Causes of the World Wars and the Contemporary Risks of a Third

Adediran Babajide, President/CEO
Carlsron Initiative for Peace and Human Rights (CIPEHR)

 

Scope: Remote and immediate causes of World War I and II; theoretical interpretations; parallels with current global conflicts (Russia–Ukraine war, ongoing Gaza conflict); assessment of risks of a future world war.

Abstract

This article examines the historical causes of World War I and World War II, drawing on realist, liberal, and constructivist theories of international relations. It distinguishes between remote structural causes—militarism, alliance systems, economic rivalries, and nationalist ideologies—and immediate triggers such as political assassinations and invasions. Historical dynamics are compared with contemporary tensions, including the Russia–Ukraine war and the ongoing Gaza conflict, to assess whether similar geopolitical fault lines are emerging today. The analysis reveals that the systemic fragilities of the early 20th century—polarized alliances, economic instability, and erosion of trust in international institutions—are once again prominent. Policy recommendations are proposed to prevent escalation into a potential Third World War.

1. Introduction

The outbreak of the two world wars in the 20th century reshaped global politics, economies, and societies. While each war had distinct triggers, both emerged from a convergence of long-term rivalries, volatile alliances, and failures of diplomacy. Today, several flashpoints—including the Russia–Ukraine war (2022–present) and the ongoing Gaza conflict (2023–2025)—are generating structural conditions reminiscent of the pre-1914 and pre-1939 eras. This article applies a historical-comparative method grounded in international relations theory to explore whether the world is moving toward another systemic conflict.

2. Theoretical Framework

The analysis in this article is grounded in several interrelated theoretical perspectives from international relations and historical scholarship that help explain both the origins of the two World Wars and the potential risks of a third.

Realist theory emphasizes the anarchic international system, power politics, and the security dilemma, where states seek survival through military buildup and alliances. The naval arms race between Britain and Germany before 1914, and the aggressive expansion of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in the 1930s, illustrate how competition for power can precipitate global conflict.

Liberal institutionalism highlights the role of international institutions and their failures in preventing war. The League of Nations’ inability to stop Japan in Manchuria (1931) and Italy in Ethiopia (1935) shows how weak enforcement undermines collective security, allowing regional disputes to escalate.

Constructivist theory focuses on how ideas, identities, and norms shape state behavior. Nationalism, militarism, and ideological rivalries—such as pan-Slavism before WWI and fascist imperialism before WWII—fueled intransigence and justified risky policies.

Power Transition Theory and Long Cycle Theory link global wars to shifts in the balance of power, when rising powers challenge established hegemons. Germany’s rise before WWI and the Axis powers’ challenge to the post-WWI order created instability that made conflict more likely.

Together, these perspectives show that large-scale wars arise from structural pressures, institutional weaknesses, and ideological forces—factors still relevant in today’s geopolitical climate.

3. Remote Causes of World War I and II

3.1 World War I
The First World War’s origins lay not only in the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 but in decades of militarization, alliance entanglement, imperial rivalry, and nationalist tensions. Militarism was central, exemplified by the Anglo–German naval arms race and rigid mobilization timetables that left little scope for diplomacy. Two opposing alliance blocs—the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) and the Triple Entente (Britain, France, Russia)—created binding commitments that could transform local disputes into continent-wide wars. Imperial competition, such as Germany’s Weltpolitik and the Moroccan Crises, deepened distrust, while nationalism—particularly Serbian ambitions supported by Russian pan-Slavism—destabilized the Balkans. Constructivist analysis shows how nationalist identities, shaped by propaganda and political discourse, influenced state behavior and heightened risks.

3.2 World War II
The Second World War was rooted in the unresolved tensions of the interwar period. The Treaty of Versailles (1919) imposed harsh terms on Germany, fostering resentment, economic instability, and revanchist politics—conditions Hitler later exploited. The Great Depression (1929) worsened global instability, undermining democracies and bolstering authoritarian regimes. Expansionist ideologies—fascism, Nazism, and Japanese militarism—rejected liberal norms in favor of racialized visions of empire. The League of Nations’ inability to respond effectively to Japan’s seizure of Manchuria (1931), Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia (1935), and Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland (1936) exposed the fragility of collective security, allowing aggressors to act with impunity.

4. Immediate Causes of the World Wars

4.1 World War I
The immediate spark was the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 by a Serbian nationalist. Austria-Hungary, with Germany’s unconditional backing, issued a deliberately unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia. Serbia’s partial refusal prompted war on 28 July, triggering alliance mobilizations: Russia backed Serbia; Germany declared war on Russia and France; Britain entered after Germany violated Belgian neutrality. Defensive realist theory explains how alliance commitments and mobilization plans, like Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, created a “security spiral” that made de-escalation nearly impossible once the crisis began.

4.2 World War II
In the late 1930s, Germany’s territorial aggression went unchecked under Britain and France’s policy of appeasement, most notably in the Anschluss (1938) and the Munich Agreement over the Sudetenland. The final trigger was Germany’s invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, enabled by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, which divided Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union. Britain and France declared war two days later. Offensive realist theory interprets Hitler’s moves as calculated exploitation of perceived weakness in the Western powers and the absence of U.S. involvement, with appeasement eroding deterrence and accelerating the march to war.

5. Contemporary Risks of a Third World War

The structural and immediate causes of the two world wars provide a sobering lens through which to examine present-day global tensions. Multiple regions are now characterized by military buildups, rigid alliance commitments, and ideological polarization—conditions historically associated with large-scale conflict. The U.S.–China strategic rivalry mirrors aspects of the Anglo–German naval arms race, with competition extending beyond military domains into technology, trade, and influence over international norms. The militarization of the South China Sea, coupled with mutual suspicion and limited crisis communication, raises the risk of inadvertent escalation.

Similarly, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 represents the most significant breach of the post-Cold War European security order, evoking parallels with both the remilitarization of the Rhineland (1936) and the Sudetenland crisis (1938). NATO’s expansion eastward and Russia’s perception of encirclement fit within the security dilemma framework, where defensive measures by one side are interpreted as offensive threats by the other. The war has revived discussions about nuclear deterrence, particularly in light of Moscow’s thinly veiled nuclear threats.

The Middle East also remains a flashpoint, with the ongoing Gaza conflict (2023–2025) intensifying regional instability. Israel’s military operations and Hamas’s asymmetric warfare illustrate the challenges of applying international humanitarian law in asymmetrical conflicts. Moreover, Iran’s support for proxy groups and its nuclear ambitions heightens the risk of a broader regional confrontation, potentially drawing in global powers.

Other destabilizing factors include nuclear proliferation in North Korea, escalating India–Pakistan tensions, and the weaponization of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and cyberwarfare. From a complex interdependence perspective, while globalization has created economic linkages that could deter conflict, the same interconnections can transmit shocks rapidly across systems, making localized crises global in their effects.

6. Analytical Parallels and Warnings

The historical causes of the two world wars underscore several enduring patterns. First, the failure of deterrence—whether through ineffective alliances in 1914 or the appeasement of aggressors in 1938—encourages revisionist actors to push further. Second, rigid alliance systems can transform regional disputes into global conflagrations, as was the case with both the Triple Entente/Triple Alliance and the NATO/Warsaw Pact configurations during the Cold War. Today’s web of formal and informal security commitments—from NATO’s Article 5 to U.S. defense guarantees in East Asia—creates similar risks of escalation.

Third, the breakdown of international institutions in the face of great power rivalry remains a critical vulnerability. Just as the League of Nations failed to contain aggression in the 1930s, the current UN Security Council paralysis—exemplified by vetoes on resolutions addressing the Gaza conflict and the Ukraine war—demonstrates the limitations of international law when enforcement depends on consensus among the very powers whose behavior is at issue.

From a theoretical standpoint, offensive realism warns that in an anarchic international system, rising powers will inevitably seek to challenge the dominance of established powers, leading to instability. Conversely, liberal institutionalism holds that robust, enforceable international norms and institutions can mitigate these dynamics—but history shows that such institutions collapse when major powers withdraw their support or circumvent their rules. Constructivist theory adds that shifts in national identity and ideology—such as the normalization of militarized nationalism—can redefine what leaders and publics perceive as legitimate policy, thereby lowering the threshold for war.

The lesson is clear: the remote and immediate causes of the world wars were not anomalies of their time but structural features of international politics that can re-emerge in different guises. The challenge for the 21st century is to recognize these warning signs early enough to prevent history from repeating itself on a catastrophic scale.

7. Policy Recommendations

Addressing the risks of a potential third world war requires coordinated action that balances legal norms, diplomatic engagement, and security guarantees. First, the international community must reinforce multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and regional security bodies to ensure they retain the authority and resources to de-escalate crises before they spiral into armed conflict. Strengthening the conflict-prevention mandates of the UN Security Council, and empowering the General Assembly through mechanisms like Uniting for Peace resolutions, can provide viable alternatives when great power rivalries paralyze decision-making.

Second, nuclear and advanced weapons proliferation must be addressed through renewed arms control agreements and rigorous enforcement mechanisms. The erosion of treaties such as the INF Treaty and the growing development of hypersonic and autonomous weapons heighten the potential for miscalculation in crisis situations. States should prioritize reviving disarmament talks, perhaps through a 21st-century analogue to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, but adapted to new technological realities.

Third, diplomatic norms must be reinforced to counter the increasing resort to unilateral action and military adventurism. Track-two diplomacy, preventive mediation, and confidence-building measures should be institutionalized, particularly in regions experiencing persistent tensions such as Eastern Europe, the South China Sea, and the Middle East. This requires not only governmental commitment but also the engagement of non-state actors, including civil society and international NGOs, to sustain dialogue in politically closed environments.

Finally, addressing structural causes of conflict — economic inequality, resource competition, and climate-induced displacement — must be integrated into peace and security agendas. As history demonstrates, the grievances that fuel large-scale wars often build over decades through systemic neglect. Development policies that promote inclusive growth, fair trade, and equitable resource distribution can reduce the likelihood of conflicts escalating to the level of a global catastrophe.

Conclusion

The First and Second World Wars were not accidents of history but the product of escalating tensions, structural rivalries, and systemic failures in diplomacy. The contemporary international system faces analogous pressures: great power competition, proliferation of advanced weapons, and unresolved territorial and ideological disputes. While the existence of nuclear deterrence and global institutions makes a third world war less likely in the short term, the erosion of arms control agreements, weakening of multilateralism, and rise of nationalist politics increase long-term risks. Preventing a new global conflict will require a deliberate reaffirmation of legal norms, investment in conflict prevention, and the political will to prioritize cooperation over confrontation. Without such measures, history’s most devastating lessons risk being repeated — on an even more catastrophic scale.

Final Thought:
The prospect of a Third World War is not an inevitable outcome of current tensions—but history warns that passivity in the face of incremental aggression can create the conditions for catastrophic escalation. Avoiding such a fate requires a blend of historical consciousness, political will, and institutional innovation. Only by addressing both the remote causes and the immediate risks can the international community hope to transform the trajectory from confrontation to cooperation.

 

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