Requisitions and Contributions in War: The Eternal Principle of ‘War Must Support War’ and Its Exploitation in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict

Adediran Babajide, President/CEO
Carlsron Initiative for Peace and Human Rights (CIPEHR)

 

 

Scope: Historical roots and legal evolution of “war must support war”; its exploitation in modern conflicts—particularly Russia–Ukraine—and implications for international humanitarian law and accountability.

Abstract

The maxim “war must support war,” originating in military theory and absorbed into the fabric of international law, continues to shape the regulation of requisitions and contributions in armed conflict. From Clausewitz’s dictum to Oppenheim’s legal commentary, this principle justified the expectation that armies could sustain themselves from enemy territory. While codified and restricted in the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions, it remains a contested “gray zone” of international humanitarian law (IHL). This article examines the evolution of the principle, its current legal status, and its alleged exploitation by Russia in the ongoing war against Ukraine. By situating the issue historically, analyzing the regulatory framework, and exploring Russia’s practices in occupied territories, the article argues that although the principle persists under law, Russia’s conduct has exceeded permissible limits, blurring the line between lawful requisitions and unlawful pillage. The conclusion highlights the urgent need for stronger enforcement mechanisms and clearer interpretative standards in IHL.

 

Introduction

The concept that “war must support war” has long informed military practice and legal theory. Armies, operating in hostile territories, have historically relied on requisitions and monetary contributions imposed on local populations to sustain operations. This principle was articulated most famously by Carl von Clausewitz, who regarded it as an “eternal” necessity of warfare (Clausewitz, 1984 [1832]). Later, Lassa Oppenheim, the eminent jurist, integrated the maxim into international law by observing that requisitions and contributions were the legal outgrowth of this principle, though subject to regulation (Oppenheim, 1906).

In contemporary conflicts, however, this maxim collides with humanitarian protections enshrined in the Hague Regulations of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and their Additional Protocols. Russia’s war against Ukraine has reopened the debate over the relevance and legality of this principle. Reports from international organizations suggest that Russian occupying forces have engaged in forced requisitions and economic exploitation of occupied territories, raising concerns about whether such actions reflect the residual permissibility of “war must support war” or constitute violations of international humanitarian law (Human Rights Watch, 2022; United Nations Human Rights Council, 2023).

This article examines the historical foundations, legal framework, and current controversies surrounding requisitions and contributions. It evaluates Russia’s practices in Ukraine to demonstrate how this principle continues to occupy a legal gray zone, open to abuse in modern armed conflicts.

 

Historical Foundations of the Principle

Carl von Clausewitz first articulated the principle that “war must support war” in On War. He argued that armies, particularly when invading, could not rely solely on their national treasuries but must extract resources from the enemy’s territory (Clausewitz, 1984). For Clausewitz, this was not only expedient but an “eternal principle” of conflict.

Oppenheim advanced the debate by reframing the military maxim in legal terms. Writing in his International Law: A Treatise, he noted:
“Requisitions and contributions in war are the outcome of the eternal principle that war must support war” (Oppenheim, 1906, §146).

For him, this principle reflected historical practice but required regulation to distinguish between lawful requisition and unlawful pillage. This transition—from Clausewitz’s strategic axiom to Oppenheim’s legal recognition—embedded the principle in early international law, while also signaling its potential for abuse.

The Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 codified this reality by permitting requisitions and contributions under strict conditions. Article 52 allowed requisitions only for the needs of the occupying army, proportional to local capacity, and subject to receipts and compensation. Article 49 restricted money contributions to orders issued by a commander and required transparency (Hague Regulations, 1907). Thus, the principle survived but within a narrowed legal framework.

 

Requisitions and Contributions under International Law

Modern international law recognizes requisitions and contributions as lawful practices under limited circumstances.

1. Hague Regulations (1907): Requisitions and contributions must be proportionate, necessary for the occupying army, and compensated. Arbitrary exactions are prohibited.
2. Geneva Convention IV (1949): Article 33 explicitly prohibits collective penalties, pillage, and reprisals against civilians. Occupying powers must not deprive the local population of essential supplies.
3. Additional Protocol I (1977): Reinforces civilian protection, limiting requisition powers to cases of “imperative military necessity.”
4. Customary International Humanitarian Law (ICRC Study, 2005): Confirms that requisitions are lawful only under necessity, proportionality, and compensation.

The law therefore permits requisitions but draws a sharp distinction between lawful practices and prohibited exploitation. As Schmitt (2011) observes, the challenge lies in applying these rules during dynamic conflicts, where military necessity is often invoked to justify excessive measures.

 

Gray Areas and Controversies

Despite codification, requisitions remain a gray area of IHL. Three issues illustrate the ambiguity:

• Military Necessity vs. Civilian Protection: Occupying forces often argue that requisitions are militarily necessary, while local populations experience them as coercive exactions bordering on pillage.
• Economic Exploitation: Contributions in the form of financial levies can blur into resource exploitation, prohibited by Article 55 of the Hague Regulations, which restricts occupiers to administering resources without permanent appropriation.
• Precedent Conflicts: World War II demonstrated the abuse of requisitions by occupying powers, leading to charges of war crimes at Nuremberg. Later conflicts, such as the U.S. occupation of Iraq, reignited debates about whether resource requisition was lawful or exploitative (Roberts, 2006).

Thus, while law provides guidance, the operationalization of the principle remains vulnerable to abuse, particularly in asymmetric conflicts where enforcement is weak.

 

Case Study: Russia–Ukraine War

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and subsequent occupation of territories in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia has brought requisitions back into the spotlight.

Reports of Requisitions:

• Ukrainian authorities and international monitors report widespread requisitioning of agricultural products, fuel, and vehicles by Russian forces (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2023).
• In Kherson, farmers were allegedly forced to “sell” grain at below-market rates, often without real compensation—effectively requisition by coercion (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Contributions and Economic Levies:

• Russian-installed administrations reportedly imposed taxes and fees on local businesses to fund occupying forces (International Crisis Group, 2023).
• Such contributions lack the transparency and accountability required under Hague Article 49, raising concerns of illegality.

Legal Implications:

• If requisitions were conducted without receipts, adequate compensation, or proportionality, they amount to pillage, a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 8(2)(b)(xvi)).
• Russia’s framing of these practices as “integration measures” in annexed regions further complicates the legal debate, as annexation is itself unlawful under international law (UNGA Resolution ES-11/4, 2022).

Therefore, Russia’s conduct illustrates how the principle “war must support war” can be exploited in ways that cross the line from lawful requisition into unlawful appropriation and pillage.

 

Critical Analysis

The case of Russia and Ukraine reveals the continuing relevance and danger of the “eternal principle.” On one hand, the law of occupation permits requisitions when necessary and compensated. On the other, Russia’s actions appear designed less to support immediate military needs than to undermine Ukraine’s economy and integrate occupied territories into Russia’s system.

This practice demonstrates the thin line between lawful requisition and unlawful exploitation. As Dinstein (2022) notes, the principle has been so circumscribed by humanitarian law that its survival is largely nominal. Modern military logistics reduce the need for requisitions, and when practiced without safeguards, they invite accusations of pillage.

Russia’s exploitation of the principle suggests two broader lessons:

1. The principle persists in law but as a vestigial concept. It is invoked primarily in occupations but constrained by humanitarian norms.
2. The enforcement gap remains significant. Despite legal restrictions, occupying powers can still exploit gray zones, especially when international accountability mechanisms are slow or politically contested.

 

Conclusion

This article has traced the trajectory of the principle that “war must support war” from Clausewitz’s strategic axiom to Oppenheim’s legal recognition, through codification in the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions, to its contested application in the Russia–Ukraine war.

The principle survives in modern IHL but only in a restricted, regulated form. Requisitions and contributions are lawful if necessary, proportional, and compensated, yet easily abused in practice. Russia’s conduct in occupied Ukraine—marked by coercive requisitions, exploitative contributions, and inadequate compensation—demonstrates how the principle can be manipulated to blur the line between lawful occupation practices and war crimes.

To close this gray zone, the international community must strengthen enforcement mechanisms, clarify the scope of lawful requisitions, and hold violators accountable. The “eternal principle” may persist, but its misuse underscores the enduring tension between the necessities of war and the imperatives of humanitarian law.

 

References

• Clausewitz, C. von (1984 [1832]). On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Dinstein, Y. (2022). The International Law of Belligerent Occupation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Hague Regulations (1907). Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.
• Human Rights Watch (2022). “Ukraine: Russian Forces Loot, Destroy Civilian Property.” HRW Report, May 2022.
• International Crisis Group (2023). “The Economic Dimension of Russia’s Occupation of Ukraine.” Brussels: ICG Briefing Paper.
• International Criminal Court, Rome Statute (1998). Article 8(2)(b)(xvi).
• International Committee of the Red Cross (2005). Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Oppenheim, L. (1906). International Law: A Treatise, Vol. II – War and Neutrality. London: Longmans, Green & Co.
• Roberts, A. (2006). Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights. American Journal of International Law, 100(3), 580–622.
• Schmitt, M. (2011). “Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance.” Virginia Journal of International Law, 50(4), 795–839.
• United Nations General Assembly (2022). Resolution ES-11/4, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine: Defending the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
• United Nations Human Rights Council (2023). Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine.